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Abstract
We analyze the optimal combination of promotion tournaments and individual
performance pay in an employment relationship. An agent’s effort is non-observable
and he has private information about his suitability for promotion. We find that
the principal does not provide individual incentives if it is sufficiently important to
promote the most suitable candidate. Thus, we give a possible explanation for why
individual performance schemes are less often observed in practice than predicted
by theory. Furthermore, optimally trading off incentive and selection issues causes
a form of the Peter Principle: The less suitable agent has an inefficiently high
probability of promotion.
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1 Introduction
Firms usually use incentive schemes not only to motivate their employees to exert high
effort but also as a selection device. This is particularly true for promotion tournaments,
which provide effort incentives and help to assign employees to the jobs they are best
suited for (Baker et al. 1988, Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Individual performance pay
may as well lead to incentive and selection effects. For example, Lazear (2000) shows that
the introduction of a simple piece rate scheme in a U.S. auto glass company increased
output and attracted more capable workers.
There is a large literature that identifies conditions under which relative incentive
schemes dominate individual performance pay or vice versa.1 Most of this literature fo-
cuses on the provision of incentives. By contrast, we examine how relative and individual
compensation forms should be combined when incentive and selection issues arise simul-
taneously. Our objective is not to characterize an optimal mechanism, but rather to look
at two incentive schemes that are of high practical relevance: piece rates and promotion
tournaments.
We consider a large manufacturing firm that needs to design compensation contracts
for its two lowest hierarchy levels: production and lower management. Production workers
can be motivated by a piece rate system and/or the prospect of being promoted to a
management position. Our main result is that the introduction of a piece rate may
interfere with the selection of high-ability managers by means of a promotion tournament.
The firm may therefore wish to set only low-powered individual incentives, or even refrain
from implementing individual performance pay.
The rationale behind this result is as follows. A production worker has private informa-
tion about his suitability for promotion since he is better informed about his abilities and
preferences than the firm. Furthermore, because workers and managers perform different
1See, e.g., Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), or Rosen
(1986).
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tasks, production output cannot serve as a signal per se about a worker’s suitability for
the management job. However, given that good performance in the management job will
be rewarded, workers who perceive themselves as capable future managers have a higher
valuation for being promoted. Due to this higher valuation, more capable candidates work
harder when the firm selects the best-performing worker for promotion. Consequently,
by implementing a promotion tournament, the firm can use a worker’s production output
as a signal about his suitability for promotion. The introduction of individual perfor-
mance pay, however, can dilute the informativeness of this signal. This is because workers
who are less suitable for promotion may respond relatively more strongly to intensified
individual incentives in the production stage.
This result also provides a reason as to why individual incentive schemes are less often
observed in practice than predicted by theory (Parent 2002). Alternative explanations are
discussed in the literature. Holmstro¨m and Milgrom (1991) show that it may be optimal
not to implement an incentive scheme if the agent’s task has different dimensions, where
some are more easily measured than others. According to Bernheim and Whinston (1998),
contracting parties might want to leave some verifiable aspects of performance unspecified
when there are other important but non-verifiable aspects of performance, since this may
allow to punish undesired behavior. Another possible reason originates from psychology.
It states that monetary incentive payments may crowd out intrinsic motivation (Deci
1971). Frey and Oberholzer-Gee (1997), Benabou and Tirole (2003), and Sliwka (2006)
provide economic explanations for the occurrence of crowding-out.
What we have in mind is a situation where the owner of a large firm has to select the
firm’s organizational structure. In particular, the owner wishes to stipulate a compen-
sation scheme and a promotion policy to be offered to all potential production workers.
Establishing such employment rules facilitates recurrent recruitment and promotion pro-
cedures. For example, the owner usually has to delegate the implementation of these
procedures since she does not have the time to communicate with lower-level employees.
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Then, dictating strict employment rules avoids agency problems such as influence activi-
ties or collusion, which may occur when payoff-relevant decisions are left to a third party’s
discretion (e.g., Tirole 1986 or Fairburn and Malcomson 2001).
We model this problem as a principal-agent relationship between the owner of the firm
(principal) and two workers (agents). The workers are randomly recruited from a pool
of agents who share the same abilities in production but may differ in their management
skills, which can be either high or low. An agent learns his skills after signing the employ-
ment contract and entering the firm. Only then he becomes familiar with the tasks of a
lower manager in this particular firm and can assess how good he would be at it. While
the principal never observes agents’ skills, an agent also learns the ability of his coworker.
This assumption reflects that employees who work closely together usually possess better
information about one another’s talents and ambitions than the principal. Furthermore,
assuming that agents know one another’s type greatly simplifies the analysis.2
At the production stage, effort is non-observable. However, there is a contractible per-
formance measure such that the principal is able to establish a piece rate scheme.3 In the
management job, effort cannot be observed either. Moreover, since lower-level managers
usually perform difficult-to-measure tasks such as supervising subordinates or organiz-
ing the workflow in production, contractible performance measures are not available.4 A
manager therefore receives a fixed salary and exerts some minimum required effort level.
Since high-skilled agents have lower effort costs at the management stage, their valuation
of becoming a manager is higher.
The employment contract states that, in the first period, both agents are employed as
production workers. At the end of the period, the agent with the higher output is pro-
2Nevertheless, the first-best allocation may not be implementable, e.g. if post-contractual communi-
cation between principal and agents is not possible, or agents can collude (Laffont and Martimort 2000).
We discuss this point in more detail in section 2, fn. 8.
3For example, at the auto glass company that Lazear (2000) investigates, an installer receives a piece
rate based on the number of glass units he installed.
4This assumption is not crucial for our results but greatly simplifies the analysis. We discuss the
extension to incentive contracts at the management stage in section 5.
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moted to a management position. Compensation is composed of a fixed wage and a piece
rate for the production task, and a fixed salary for the management job, which constitutes
the tournament prize. This contract has to serve two objectives: motivating production
workers and, in case agents are heterogeneous, increasing the chances of selecting the
high-skilled agent for promotion.
Our second result concerns how the optimal contract, in balancing incentive and se-
lection considerations, distorts agents’ effort choices. If both agents are high-skilled, they
work too hard compared to the efficient effort level. By contrast, if both agents are
low-skilled, they exert too little effort. The reason is that, under any given contract,
high-skilled agents are better motivated since they gain relatively more from promotion.
If agents are heterogeneous, inducing a large difference between the high-skilled and the
low-skilled agent’s effort level improves selection. Taking this into account, under the
optimal contract, the more able agent puts in too little effort and the less able agent too
much. Thus, the latter has an inefficiently high promotion probability. The principal
accepts this inefficiency as a result of optimally trading off incentive and selection issues.
This outcome can be interpreted as a mild form of the Peter Principle, which states that
employees are promoted to their level of incompetence (Peter and Hull 1969). Fairburn
and Malcomson (2001) show that the conflicting goals of incentive provision and risk
allocation may also cause the Peter Principle. However, this happens only if agents are
risk-averse. In our model, agents are risk-neutral. Lazear (2004) offers a different approach
to explain the Peter Principle. In his paper, the observation that employees’ performance
often declines after receiving promotion is a necessary consequence of a statistical process.
A promoted agent experienced exceptionally good random influences before the promotion
decision. On average, however, he will be less lucky afterwards.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on selection tournaments. Such
tournaments have been analyzed by Rosen (1986), Meyer (1991), Clark and Riis (2001),
Hvide and Kristiansen (2003), and, in the context of sabotage, by Lazear (1989), Chen
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(2003), and Mu¨nster (2006). In contrast to these authors, we focus on the selection effect
of a promotion tournament in combination with a piece rate scheme. Furthermore, in our
model, agents are heterogeneous in the tournament stage only because they differ in their
valuations of the tournament prize. In the aforementioned papers, agents’ heterogeneity
is due to different abilities in the tournament stage.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in section 2. In section
3, we derive agents’ effort levels at the production stage given the tournament prize and
individual performance pay. The optimal combination of the tournament prize and the
individual incentive scheme is characterized in section 4. Section 5 discusses the impact
of some our assumptions on the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
A risk-neutral principal owns a firm in which two kinds of tasks need to be performed:
manufacturing tasks (production stage) and management tasks (management stage). The
firm regularly recruits risk-neutral agents to carry out these tasks. There are more jobs
in production than in management.
We focus on two representative periods in the firm’s life. At the beginning of the
first period, the firm needs to hire two production workers. At the beginning of the
second period, there is a vacant management position. Instead of recruiting from the
external labor market, the principal prefers to fill this position with one of the production
workers. The reason is that production workers acquire firm-specific knowledge that
increases productivity in the management task. For simplicity, we assume that the other
production worker leaves the firm at the end of the first period.
There are two different types of agents in the labor market, denoted type A and type
B. They are equally skilled in the manufacturing task, but differ in their abilities for the
6
management job.5 Agents of type A can conduct the management task more efficiently
than agents of type B. Prior to the contracting stage, neither the principal nor the
agents observe their respective types. It is, however, common knowledge that an agent
is of type A with probability p and of type B with probability 1 − p, where 0 < p < 1.
After accepting the contract offered by the principal and entering into the employment
relationship, each agent observes his own type and that of his coworker. The principal
never observes agents’ types. For simplicity, we assume that an agent’s reservation utility
is independent of his type and equals zero throughout the game.
At the production stage, agent i, i = 1, 2, chooses a non-observable effort level ei ≥ 0
leading to the verifiable output
qi = ei + µi, (1)
where µ1 and µ2 are identically and independently distributed random variables with
mean zero and µ1, µ2 ∈ R. An agent’s effort cost function c(ei) is strictly increasing and
convex in ei. To ensure the existence of a pure-strategy equilibrium at the production
stage, we further assume that infe>0 c
′′(e) > 0. Since effort is non-observable, the principal
cannot contract upon it. She can, however, offer an incentive contract based on qi. We
restrict our attention to linear incentive schemes, assuming that an agent’s wage at the
production stage is composed of a piece rate r conditioned on qi and a fixed payment w1.
At the management stage, for the reasons discussed in the introduction, there are
no contractible performance measures. A manager therefore exerts only some minimum
required effort level and receives a fixed wage w2 in return. However, since agents of type
A have a higher ability for conducting the management task, their expected contribution
to firm value under the minimum effort level is higher than that of type B agents. Letting
Πk, k ∈ {A,B}, denote type k’s expected contribution to firm value on the management
stage, it holds that ΠA > ΠB. Moreover, we assume that type A has lower costs for
5In section 5, we discuss an extension to the case of different abilities in production.
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implementing the minimum effort level than type B.6 To reduce the notational burden,
we normalize type B’s effort costs to zero, while agent A’s costs are −δ, where δ > 0.
Type A therefore obtains a higher payment net of effort costs from being employed as a
manager.
Since ΠA > ΠB, the principal prefers to select a type A agent for pursuing the man-
agement task. Screening agents prior to hiring is not possible since they do not know their
types at this stage. Furthermore, to ensure that one of the former production workers
agrees to be employed as a manager, even if both workers are of type B, the principal has
to offer a management wage w2 ≥ 0. Under such a wage, there will be no self-selection
since both workers always prefer becoming a manager to leaving the firm.7 Due to the
principal’s lack of time, post-contractual communication is not feasible.8
However, to increase the chances of employing a type A agent as a manager, the prin-
cipal can try to take advantage of the fact that type A agents have a higher valuation for
being promoted within the firm. To do so, the principal designs the following promotion
tournament: In the first period, both agents are assigned to the manufacturing task. At
the end of this period, the agent with the higher output is promoted to the management
position. The tournament prize is the management wage w2. Under this promotion rule,
performance at the production stage serves as a signal about skills for the management
job. As we show in section 3, whenever the randomly recruited agents are heterogeneous,
type A exerts higher effort than type B. This is because type A’s valuation of promotion
6Thus, in our model, being of a superior type means having higher marginal productivity and lower
marginal effort costs. Usually, only one of these assumptions is made to model different abilities of agents.
We require both of them because we only allow for a fixed wage at the management stage. Refer to section
5 for a detailed explanation.
7Note that type B’s weak preference for becoming a manager can easily be turned into a strong one
by introducing costs for changing to a new firm after the first period.
8This assumption prevents the implementation of the first-best solution. The first-best solution is
also not implementable if communication is feasible but agents can collude and there is the threat that
the principal uses information on agents’ types opportunistically. To see this, let wi2 denote the wage of
a type i manager. Offering a wage wi2 that exceeds type i’s effort costs may not be credible since the
principal can use information on the agent’s type to lower his wage ex-post. Thus, wA2 = −δ and wB2 = 0.
However, under such wages, if at least one agent is of type A, agents obtain a positive expected rent from
colluding to report that they both are of type B.
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is higher. Consequently, the better performing agent is more likely to be of type A.
Note that applying such a promotion tournament causes the following inefficiency:
Even though both types of agents are equally skilled in production, they will exert dif-
ferent effort levels in the manufacturing task. However, if the promotion decision is
sufficiently crucial for firm performance (i.e. ΠA − ΠB is high), the principal prefers to
design a promotion tournament, thereby improving her information about agents’ types,
to implementing efficient effort in the manufacturing task. We henceforth assume that
this is the case.
The timing of the game is as follows. First the principal offers each of two randomly
chosen agents a contract consisting of a piece rate scheme (r, w1) and a management wage
w2. After accepting the contract, each agent learns his type and that of his coworker.
Then, both agents are assigned to the manufacturing task and choose their respective
effort levels ei.
9 Once output levels qi are realized, payments are made according to
the piece rate scheme. Furthermore, the agent with the higher output is promoted to
the management level and obtains w2. The other agent leaves the firm and receives his
reservation utility.10
3 Effort in the Production Stage
In this section, we derive agents’ effort choices in the production stage under a given
contract. To do so, we need to account for three possible matches of agents: two homoge-
neous matches where both agents are either of type A or of type B; and a heterogeneous
match with a type A and a type B agent. For each match, we determine the combination
9Agents thus observe their types after signing the contract but before choosing effort levels. In practice,
this information might be acquired during a training period, where workers already exert some effort.
However, we assume that this period is short relative to the overall time workers spent at the production
stage and can therefore be neglected.
10Alternatively, one could assume that the losing agent stays with the firm and competes in the next
period with a newly hired agent. However, such an extension complicates the analysis without offering
any additional insights.
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of effort choices that constitutes a pure-strategy Nash-equilibrium.
By implementing effort in the production stage, agents do not only affect their incentive
payments conditional on production output, but also their probability of being promoted
to the management level. Agent i’s promotion probability is
Prob[qi > qj] = Prob[ei − ej > µj − µi] ≡ G(ei − ej), i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j, (2)
where G(·) is the cumulative distribution function of the random variable µj − µi. Let
g(·) denote the corresponding density function, which we assume to be differentiable and
single-peaked at zero. Since µi and µj are identically distributed, g(·) is symmetric around
zero.
We start by investigating the case of homogeneous agents. First suppose that both
randomly employed agents are of type A. Taking the effort of agent j as given, agent i
chooses ei to maximize his expected payment
w1 +G(ei − ej)(w2 + δ) + rei − c(ei). (3)
It is straightforward to verify that the Nash-equilibrium is unique and symmetric. The
equilibrium effort, denoted eAA, is implicitly defined by the first-order condition
g(0)(w2 + δ) + r = c
′(eAA). (4)
Similarly, for the case where both agents are of type B, we obtain that equilibrium
effort eBB is characterized by
g(0)w2 + r = c
′(eBB). (5)
To ensure that eAA and eBB indeed represent Nash-equilibria, it is sufficient to require
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that agents’ objective functions are concave. This is the case if
g′(ei − ej)(w2 + δ)− c′′(ei) < 0 for all ei, ej ≥ 0, (6)
and g′(ei − ej)w2 − c′′(ei) < 0 for all ei, ej ≥ 0. (7)
We assume that these conditions are satisfied for the highest w2 that the principal might
be willing to offer the agents.11 Since infe>0 c
′′ > 0, this is the case whenever random
influences on output are significant enough, i.e. g(.) is sufficiently “flat”.
Now we turn to the case of heterogeneous agents. Without loss of generality, assume
that agent 1 is of type A and agent 2 is of type B. Type A’s and type B’s respective
optimization problems are:
max
e1
w1 +G(e1 − e2)(w2 + δ) + re1 − c(e1) (8)
max
e2
w1 + [1−G(e1 − e2)]w2 + re2 − c(e2) (9)
Type A’s and B’s equilibrium effort levels eA and eB, respectively, are given by the
following two first-order conditions:
g(eA − eB)(w2 + δ) + r = c′(eA) (10)
g(eA − eB)w2 + r = c′(eB) (11)
The second-order conditions are identical to (6) and (7) and are thus satisfied.
From (10) and (11) it becomes clear that ∆e ≡ eA− eB > 0. Because type A’s benefit
from being promoted is higher, he is motivated to work harder than type B under each
given incentive scheme. Consequently, type A has a higher probability of winning the
11Recall that agents’ effort costs are convex, whereas the principal’s expected profit will be concave in
effort. Since the principal has to compensate both agents for their disutility of effort to guarantee their
participation, it cannot be optimal to induce arbitrarily high effort levels. Thus, there exists an upper
bound for w2.
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promotion tournament, i.e. G(∆e) > 0.5.
We demonstrate in the appendix (see the proof of Proposition 1) that eA and eB are
increasing in r and w2. Besides this incentive effect, enhancing either r or w2 also has a
selection effect. The latter arises from the fact that modifying r or w2 affects the effort
difference ∆e and thus agents’ promotion probabilities. Proposition 1 characterizes the
selection effect.
Proposition 1 Suppose the randomly recruited agents are heterogeneous. If c′′′ > 0 (c′′′ <
0), type A’s probability of winning the promotion tournament is decreasing (increasing)
in r and w2.
All proofs are given in the appendix.
When the principal strengthens incentives by raising r or w2, both types of agents are
motivated to exert more effort. Whose effort increases more rapidly depends on the form
of the effort cost function. If marginal effort costs increase disproportionately, i.e. c′′′ > 0,
the harder working type A responds less strongly to intensified incentives than type B.
In this case, providing higher incentives lowers type A’s chances for promotion and is
therefore detrimental to selection. In contrast, if c′′′ < 0, type A’s winning probability
increases in r and w2.
Our main result, stated subsequently in Proposition 3, is derived under the assumption
that c′′′ > 0. By Proposition 1, this is equivalent to the presumption that, in a tournament
with heterogeneous agents, the harder working agent’s effort choice is less sensitive to
enhanced incentives. We believe this case to be more relevant than the opposite one,
but are not aware of any empirical evidence that supports this conjecture. However, at
the least, it seems reasonable to assume that there are circumstances under which our
conjecture holds.
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4 The Principal’s Problem
We now consider the principal’s problem of optimally choosing the contract elements
w1, w2, and r. Her optimization problem can be stated as:
max
w1,w2,r,eA,eB ,eAA,eBB
2p(1− p)[(1− r)(eA + eB) +G(∆e)ΠA + (1−G(∆e))ΠB]
+p2[2(1− r)eAA +ΠA] + (1− p)2[2(1− r)eBB +ΠB]− 2w1 − w2 (12)
s.t. (4), (5), (10), (11), and
w1 + p(1− p)[G(∆e)(w2 + δ) + reA − c(eA)] + (1− p)p[(1−G(∆e))w2 + reB − c(eB)]
+p2[0.5(w2 + δ) + reAA − c(eAA)] + (1− p)2[0.5w2 + reBB − c(eBB)] ≥ 0 (13)
The objective function (12) is composed of the principal’s expected profits under each pos-
sible tournament match weighted by their respective probabilities of occurrence. When
maximizing her expected profit, the principal has to take into account the incentive com-
patibility constraints for each potential tournament match and the agents’ participation
constraint (13).
First observe that, for any given r and w2, cost minimization requires that the prin-
cipal chooses w1 such that (13) is binding. Consequently, we can eliminate w1 from the
principal’s optimization problem, which then simplifies to
max
r,w2,eA,eB ,eAA,eBB
Π := piAB + piAA + piBB s.t. (4), (5), (10), (11). (14)
The term pikl, where k, l ∈ {A,B}, denotes the expected profit of a tournament match
where one agent is of type k and the other agent of type l, weighted by its probability of
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occurrence, i.e.
piAB ≡ 2p(1− p) [eA + eB +ΠB +G(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ)− c(eA)− c(eB)] , (15)
piAA ≡ p2 [2eAA +ΠA + δ − 2c(eAA)] , (16)
piBB ≡ (1− p)2 [2eBB +ΠB − 2c(eBB)] . (17)
From a closer inspection of (15)-(17) it becomes clear that, in each tournament match,
the principal receives the entire surplus from the employment relationship. Since agents
do not possess private information prior to the contracting stage, their expected payments
are tailored to just compensate them for their effort and opportunity costs.
As a benchmark, we consider the effort levels e∗A, e
∗
B, e
∗
AA, and e
∗
BB that maximize piAB,
piAA, and piBB respectively. Defining ∆e
∗ = e∗A − e∗B, these effort levels are characterized
by the following first-order conditions:12
c′(e∗A) = 1 + g(∆e
∗)(ΠA − ΠB + δ) (18)
c′(e∗B) = 1− g(∆e∗)(ΠA − ΠB + δ) (19)
c′(e∗AA) = c
′(e∗BB) = 1 (20)
According to condition (20), agents in AA-matches should exert the same effort as agents
in BB-matches. This follows from the fact that both types of agents share the same
abilities for conducting the manufacturing task and there is no benefit from promoting a
particular agent to the management position. In contrast, in an AB-match, it is beneficial
from the principal’s perspective that the type A agent works harder than the type B agent,
i.e. e∗A > e
∗
B. Inducing such an effort difference increases the probability of promoting the
more able agent A.
The principal, however, cannot observe agents’ types and is thus not able to tailor
12Since g′(∆e) ≤ 0 for ∆e ≥ 0, second-order conditions hold.
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incentives to the particular tournament match. Therefore, she cannot induce the surplus-
maximizing effort levels. Specifically, the incentive compatibility constraints (4) and (5)
imply that the effort level in an AA-match always exceeds the one in a BB-match. Fur-
thermore, from (10) and (11) we obtain
c′(eA)− c′(eB) = g(∆e)δ. (21)
By contrast, from (18) and (19) it follows that
c′(e∗A)− c′(e∗B) = 2g(∆e∗)[ΠA − ΠB + δ]. (22)
As a result, the principal is not able to induce the surplus-maximizing effort levels in an
AB-match either. Let r∗ and w∗2 denote the contract elements that solve (14). Proposition
2 characterizes agents’ effort levels under the optimal contract.
Proposition 2 Suppose the optimal contract comprises r∗, w∗2 > 0. Then, agents in an
AA-match exert too much and agents in a BB-match exert too little effort, i.e.
eBB < e
∗
BB = e
∗
AA < eAA.
In contrast, in an AB-match, type A works too little while type B works too hard, i.e.
eA < e
∗
A and e
∗
B < eB.
Thus, agent B’s promotion probability is inefficiently high.
Note that, in an AB-match, conditions (21) and (22) prevent the implementation of e∗A
and e∗B, but not necessarily of the corresponding promotion probabilities characterized by
the effort difference e∗A− e∗B. However, to induce this effort difference, both agents’ effort
levels would have to be either inefficiently high or inefficiently low. Proposition 2 points
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out that trading off incentive and selection issues calls for inducing an inefficiently low
effort difference by making type A work too little and type B too hard. Hence, a form
of the Peter Principle occurs: The type B agent is promoted too frequently compared
to the benchmark promotion probability G(e∗A − e∗B). The principal deliberately accepts
this inefficiency as a necessary consequence of balancing incentive and selection effects
appropriately.
Recall that r and w2 are substitutes with respect to the provision of incentives in the
production stage. Accordingly, there is an infinite number of combinations of r and w2 that
induce the desired effort levels in the AB-match at the same costs for the principal. Among
these combinations, the principal selects the one that provides optimal incentives in the
homogeneous tournaments. If agents worked too little (too hard) in both homogeneous
matches, the principal’s marginal benefit of increasing (decreasing) incentives would be
positive. Consequently, at the optimal contract, agents implement inefficiently high effort
in AA-matches and inefficiently low effort in BB-matches.
The following Proposition establishes how the optimal contract elements change when
it becomes more important to the principal to promote a type A agent.
Proposition 3 Suppose that c′′′ > 0 and ΠA−ΠB increases, i.e. assigning a type A agent
to the management position becomes more desirable. The principal then offers a lower
piece rate r∗ and a higher management wage w∗2, thereby inducing a higher promotion
probability for type A in a heterogeneous tournament match.
In a heterogeneous tournament, the overall effect of these contract adjustments is such
that both eA and eB decrease, while eA − eB increases.13 Thus, A is promoted with a
higher probability.
Proposition 1 has shown that both lowering r and w2 improves selection if c
′′′ > 0.
Why, then, does the principal decrease r and increase w2 when promoting a type A agent
13All proofs are given in the Appendix.
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becomes more important? The answer can be found in the optimal incentive structure
for the homogeneous tournaments. Since selection is irrelevant in these matches, the
implemented effort should be independent of ΠA−ΠB. Indeed, the changes in r∗ and w∗2
are such that eAA and eBB remain constant. By the incentive compatibility constraints
(4) and (5), this is accomplished by adjusting the contract parameters in the following
way:
∂r∗
∂(ΠA − ΠB) = −g(0)
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA − ΠB) (23)
An increase in r∗ must be accompanied by a lower w∗2 and vice versa.
Given relation (23), it becomes clear from the incentive compatibility constraints (10)
and (11) that the overall effect on eA and eB is determined by the sign of the change in r
rather than w2.
14 Intuitively, since heterogeneous agents exert different effort levels, their
promotion probabilities are less sensitive to changes in w2 than those of homogeneous
agents. Therefore, a reduction in eA and eB aimed at improving the selection effect –
while holding eAA and eBB constant – can only be achieved by lowering the piece rate and
raising the management wage.
Now assume we impose the (certainly realistic) restriction that piece rates should
be nonnegative. Then, if selection issues become sufficiently important, the principal
completely refrains from providing individual performance pay at the production stage.
Corollary 1 Assume that the principal wishes to restrict the piece rate to nonnegative
values. If c′′′ > 0 and ΠA−ΠB is sufficiently large, then the principal does not implement
individual performance pay, i.e. r∗ = 0.
5 Discussion
In this section, we discuss the impact of some of our assumptions on the results stated
above.
14Since g(.) is single-peaked at zero, we have g(∆e) < g(0).
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So far, we have analyzed a situation where both types of agents have identical skills
in production. Now suppose instead that type A has effort costs αc(ei), α > 0, at the
production stage, whereas type B’s effort costs are still c(ej). If α < 1, type A is not only
the better manager, but also has a comparative advantage in production. By contrast, if
α > 1, type B performs the manufacturing task more efficiently than type A. We assume
that this advantage is not too strong such that, in equilibrium, type A still chooses a
higher effort level. Otherwise, the principal would always want to promote the agent with
the lower output, who is then more likely to be of type A.
Under these assumptions, it can be shown that, in a heterogeneous match, agent A’s
winning probability is decreasing in w2 and r if and only if
15
c′′(eB)− αc′′(eA) < 0. (24)
Assuming that c′′′ > 0, this condition is always satisfied if α > 1. Since type A’s marginal
costs of effort are higher than those of type B, strengthening incentives leads to an even
stronger deterioration of the selection effect than under identical abilities in production.
Thus, the results of Proposition 1 and 3 remain valid.
If α < 1, however, condition (24) may be violated. In this case, intensifying incentives
improves the selection effect so that the result in Proposition 1 is reversed. As a conse-
quence, r∗ is now increasing and w∗2 decreasing in ΠA − ΠB. The same is true when we
return to the case of identical agents in production (α = 1), but assume that marginal
effort costs are concave (i.e. c′′′ < 0).16
Finally, in our model, being of a superior type with respect to the management task
means having a higher productivity and lower effort costs. Typically, only one of these
assumptions is made to differentiate between types of agents. However, to ensure that
the principal wishes to promote a type A agent and that a type A agent has a higher
15Compare equation (29) in the Appendix.
16For all these extensions, the findings in Proposition 2 remain valid. The only exception is that, if
agents differ in their skills for the manufacturing task, e∗AA 6= e∗BB .
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valuation for promotion than a type B agent, we need to impose both assumptions. The
reason is that we only allow for a fixed management wage.
In a richer framework where incentive contracts for managers are feasible, it would be
sufficient that type A is either more productive or more cost efficient. Then, at the end of
the first period, the agent receiving promotion chooses from a menu of incentive contracts
as in a standard adverse selection model. Regardless of being more productive or more
cost efficient, a high-skilled type earns a higher rent than a low-skilled type under their
respective preferred contracts. Thus, type A still benefits more from being employed as
a manager. Furthermore, despite extracting a higher rent, type A contributes relatively
more to firm value. The principal therefore profits from applying a promotion tournament,
which increases the likelihood of selecting a type A agent for promotion. If selection issues
are sufficiently important, it should still be the case that the principal does not implement
a piece rate scheme for the manufacturing task.
6 Conclusion
We investigate the optimal combination of individual performance pay and promotion
tournaments aimed at motivating high effort and, concurrently, selecting more able agents
for promotion. We find that individual performance pay and a promotion tournament are
substitutes in the provision of incentives. As for which of these instruments the principal
should place more emphasis depends on how critical the selection aspect is towards firm
performance. The more important it is to promote the high-skilled worker, the higher
the management wage and the lower-powered are individual incentives. Moreover, if
the selection decision is sufficiently crucial, the optimal contract does not incorporate
individual incentives. Thus, even though there is a verifiable, non-distorting performance
measure available at the production stage, the principal may decide not to use it in an
individual incentive scheme. The rationale for this result is that individual rewards dilute
19
the selection effect of promotion tournaments. The harder working high-skilled agent
responds less strongly to intensified individual incentives than the agent less suited for
the management task.
We further show that, if the randomly recruited agents are heterogeneous, the agent
less suited for promotion implements too much effort, whereas the more capable agent
does not work hard enough. The former thus has an inefficiently high prospect of pro-
motion. Consequently, a form of the Peter Principle emerges: The less able agent has an
inefficiently high promotion probability. Nevertheless, the principal deliberately accepts
this inefficiency as a consequence of optimally balancing incentive and selection issues.
7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. From (10) and (11) we obtain
H
 ∂eA∂r
∂eB
∂r
 =
 −1
−1
 , (25)
where
H :=
 g′(∆e)(w2 + δ)− c′′(eA) −g′(∆e)(w2 + δ)
g′(∆e)w2 −g′(∆e)w2 − c′′(eB)
 . (26)
Since ∆e > 0, we have g′(∆e) < 0. Together with (6), (7), and −g′(∆e) = g′(−∆e) it
follows that det(H) > 0. Applying Cramer’s Rule to (25) yields
∂eA
∂r
=
−g′(∆e)δ + c′′(eB)
det(H)
> 0, (27)
∂eB
∂r
=
−g′(∆e)δ + c′′(eA)
det(H)
> 0. (28)
Consequently,
∂∆e
∂r
=
c′′(eB)− c′′(eA)
det(H)
. (29)
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If c′′′ > 0, then c′′(eB) < c′′(eA) and hence ∆e is decreasing in r. If c′′′ < 0, then ∆e is
increasing in r.
Applying the same procedure with respect to w2, we obtain
∂eA
∂w2
= g(∆e)
∂eA
∂r
, (30)
∂eB
∂w2
= g(∆e)
∂eB
∂r
, (31)
and, thus, Proposition 1 follows. 2
Proof of Proposition 2. Let L denote the Lagrangian of problem (14), and λ1, . . . , λ4
the Lagrange multipliers for the constraints (4), (5), (10), and (11), respectively. The
corresponding first-order conditions are
∂L
∂r
= λ1 + λ2 + λ3 + λ4 = 0, (32)
∂L
∂w2
= [λ1 + λ2] g(0) + [λ3 + λ4] g(∆e) = 0, (33)
∂L
∂eA
= 2p(1− p) [1 + g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ)− c′(eA)]
+λ3 [g
′(∆e)(w2 + δ)− c′′(eA)] + λ4g(∆e)w2 = 0, (34)
∂L
∂eB
= 2p(1− p) [1− g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ)− c′(eB)]
−λ3g′(∆e)(w2 + δ)− λ4 [g′(∆e)w2 + c′′(eB)] = 0, (35)
∂L
∂eAA
= 2p2 [1− c′(eAA)]− λ1c′′(eAA) = 0, (36)
∂L
∂eBB
= 2(1− p)2 [1− c′(eBB)]− λ2c′′(eBB) = 0. (37)
Since g(∆e) < g(0), it follows from (32) and (33) that λ1 + λ2 = λ3 + λ4 = 0. Suppose
for a moment that λ1 = λ2 = 0. In this case, (36) and (37) imply that c
′(eAA) = c′(eBB),
which is a contradiction to (4) and (5). Thus, λ1 = −λ2 6= 0. Consequently, by (36)
and (37), 1 − c′(eAA) and 1 − c′(eBB) must have opposite signs. Moreover, (4) and (5)
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entail c′(eAA) > c′(eBB). Therefore, 1 − c′(eAA) < 0 and 0 < 1 − c′(eBB), implying that
e∗AA < eAA and eBB < e
∗
BB.
Now suppose for a moment that λ3 = λ4 = 0. Then, (34) and (35) in conjunction
with (4) and (5) imply
1 + g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ) = g(∆e)(w2 + δ) + r, (38)
1− g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ) = g(∆e)w2 + r. (39)
Subtracting the second from the first equation yields 2(ΠA − ΠB) + δ = 0, which is a
contradiction to ΠA > ΠB and δ > 0. Thus, λ3 = −λ4 6= 0. Using this observation, (34)
and (35) can be transformed to
2p(1− p) [1 + g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ)− c′(eA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡F1
+λ3 [g
′(∆e)δ − c′′(eA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡F2
= 0, (40)
2p(1− p) [1− g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + δ)− c′(eB)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡G1
−λ3[g′(∆e)δ − c′′(eB)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡G2
= 0. (41)
Applying (10) and (11) yields
F1 = 1 + g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB − w2)− r, (42)
G1 = 1− g(∆e)(ΠA − ΠB + w2 + δ)− r. (43)
Hence, F1 > G1. Furthermore, by (6) and (7), F2 and G2 have opposite signs, so that
the same must be true for F1 and G1. As a result, F1 > 0 > G1, implying eA < e
∗
A and
e∗B < eB. 2
Proof of Proposition 3. The principal’s problem (14) can be further simplified to
max
r,w2
[Π(r, w2) ≡ piAB(r, w2) + piAA(r, w2) + piBB(r, w2)] , (44)
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where piAB(r, w2), piAA(r, w2), and piBB(r, w2) are defined as in (15)-(17). The only differ-
ence is that eAA, eBB, eA, and eB are now expressed as functions of r and w2, which are
implicitly given by (4), (5), (10), and (11), respectively. We assume that the functional
forms are such that Π(r, w2) is concave for all p ∈ (0, 1). Provided that r∗, w∗2 > 0, the
optimal contract elements are characterized by the first-order conditions
∂Π
∂r
=
∂piAB
∂r
+
∂piAA
∂r
+
∂piBB
∂r
= 0, (45)
∂Π
∂w2
=
∂piAB
∂w2
+
∂piAA
∂w2
+
∂piBB
∂w2
= 0. (46)
For y ∈ {r, w2} we obtain
∂piAB
∂y
= 2p(1− p)
[
(1− c′(eA))∂eA
∂y
+ (1− c′(eB))∂eB
∂y
+g(∆e)
∂(∆e)
∂y
(ΠA − ΠB + δ)
]
, (47)
∂piAA
∂y
= 2p2[1− c′(eAA)]∂eAA
∂y
, (48)
∂piBB
∂y
= 2(1− p)2[1− c′(eBB)]∂eBB
∂y
. (49)
Then, (45) and (46) imply
K
 ∂r∗∂(ΠA−ΠB)
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA−ΠB)
 =
 −2p(1− p)g(∆e)∂(∆e)∂r
−2p(1− p)g(∆e)∂(∆e)
∂w2
 , (50)
where
K :=
 ∂2Π∂r2 ∂2Π∂r∂w2
∂2Π
∂r∂w2
∂2Π
∂w22
 . (51)
From (30) and (31) it follows that ∂(∆e)
∂w2
= g(∆e)∂(∆e)
∂r
. Using this relationship and apply-
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ing Cramer’s Rule to (50) yields
∂r∗
∂(ΠA − ΠB) det(K) = 2p(1− p)g(∆e)
∂(∆e)
∂r
[
g(∆e)
∂2Π
∂r∂w2
− ∂
2Π
∂w22
]
, (52)
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA − ΠB) det(K) = 2p(1− p)g(∆e)
∂(∆e)
∂r
[
∂2Π
∂r∂w2
− g(∆e)∂
2Π
∂r2
]
. (53)
These expressions can be transformed to17
∂r∗
∂(ΠA − ΠB) det(K) =
−2p(1− p)g(∆e)∂(∆e)
∂r
g(0)[g(0)− g(∆e)]
[
∂2piAA
∂r2
+
∂2piBB
∂r2
]
, (54)
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA − ΠB) det(K) =
2p(1− p)g(∆e)∂(∆e)
∂r
[g(0)− g(∆e)]
[
∂2piAA
∂r2
+
∂2piBB
∂r2
]
. (55)
Since Π is concave, K must be negative definite. Thus, det(K) > 0. Since c′′′ > 0,
according to Proposition 1, ∂∆e
∂r
< 0. Furthermore, since Π = piAA for p = 1 and Π = piBB
for p = 0, concavity of Π for all p ∈ (0, 1) implies concavity of piAA and piBB. Thus,
∂2piii
∂r2
< 0 for i = A,B. Overall, we therefore obtain
∂r∗
∂(ΠA − ΠB) < 0,
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA − ΠB) > 0. (56)
From the equations (54) and (55) it follows immediately that
∂r∗
∂(ΠA − ΠB) = −g(0)
∂w∗2
∂(ΠA − ΠB) . (57)
Using (57) in a comparative statics analysis applied to (10) and (11), it is easily verified
that ∂eA
∂(ΠA−ΠB) ,
∂eB
∂(ΠA−ΠB) < 0, and
∂(∆e)
∂(ΠA−ΠB) > 0. Moreover, using (57) in conjunction with
17A proof is available from the authors upon request.
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(4) and (5), it is straightforward to verify that ∂eAA
∂(ΠA−ΠB) =
∂eBB
∂(ΠA−ΠB) = 0. 2
Proof of Corollary 1. First recall that ∂∆e
∂r
< 0. Then, from (45) and (47)-(49), we can
see that there is a pair ΠˆA, ΠˆB such that maxw2
∂Π
∂r
∣∣
r=0
< 0 for all ΠA − ΠB > ΠˆA − ΠˆB.
Since Π is concave, ∂Π
∂r
is decreasing in r for all w2. Thus,
∂Π
∂r
< 0 for all r > 0 and
ΠA − ΠB > ΠˆA − ΠˆB. Hence, r∗ = 0 for all ΠA − ΠB > ΠˆA − ΠˆB. 2
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